Can a Right of First Refusal Be Assigned? by Mitchell, Jonathan F.
Can a Right of First Refusal Be Assigned?
Jonathan F Mitchellt
A right of first refusal, also known as a "preemptive right," is a
right to purchase in advance of all others on specified terms, but it is
only triggered if the owner decides to sell.' Rights of first refusal can
exist in real estate,' corporate securities,' franchise agreements, oil and
gas leases,' employment contracts, and all sorts of commercial assets.
Most preemptive rights are created by the agreement of the parties;
however, both Congress and state legislatures have provided for statu-
tory rights of first refusal, usually to protect franchisees, tenants, or
farmers.8
Most rights of first refusal allow the rightholder to purchase at
the same price offered by a third party. However, parties may some-
times arrange a "fixed price" right of first refusal that permits the
rightholder to preempt a third party at a prearranged price, even if the
third party offers a higher price. Because of judicial hostility to these
t B.A. 1998, Wheaton College; J.D. Candidate 2001, The University of Chicago.
1 Because the holder of a right of first refusal cannot compel the owner to sell, see Anno-
tation, Pre-Emptive Rights to Realty as Violation of Rule Against Perpetuities or Rule Concerning
Restraints on Alienation, 40 ALR3d 920, 924-25 (1971) (describing basic characteristics of pre-
emptive rights), it is distinguishable from an ordinary option and is best described as a contin-
gent option.
2 Board of Education of Worthington City School District v Homewood Corp, 1996 Ohio
App LEXIS 3519, *1 (involving right of first refusal of repurchase of undeveloped land).
3 Braun Welding Supply, Inc v Praxair, Inc, 654 S2d 388, 389-90 (La App 1995) (involving
right of first refusal in sale of a corporation's stock). See also E Hodge O'Neal and Robert B.
Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations § 7.05 at 18 (Callaghan 3d ed 1996) (stating that option
agreements are the "most common of transfer restrictions" and these often take the form of a
right of first refusal).
4 Schupack v McDonald's System, Inc, 200 Neb 485,264 NW2d 827,828 (1978) (involving
right of first refusal to operate a fast food franchise).
5 Perritt Co v Mitchell, 663 SW2d 696,697 (Tex App 1983) (involving right of first refusal
in oil, gas, and mineral leases).
6 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc v Wolf, 76 AD2d 162,430 NYS2d 275,277 (1980)
(involving a right of first refusal that gave the employer an opportunity to match any offer from
another company "only in substance and not in every particular" for three months after the expi-
ration of the original employment contract).
7 See, for example, West Texas Transmission, LP v Enron Corp, 907 F2d 1554, 1556 (5th
Cir 1990) (involving a right of first refusal in a natural gas pipeline).
8 See, for example, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub L No 103-371, 108 Stat 3484
(1994), codified at 15 USC § 2802 (1994) (granting a service station franchisee a right of first re-
fusal to purchase the station if the distributor wishes to sell the property). Several states have
passed statutes that give farmers whose land has been foreclosed a right of first refusal to repur-
chase the land when the foreclosing agency attempts to sell it. See Minn Stat Ann § 500.245 subd
1(a) (West 1990 & Supp 2001); Iowa Code Ann § 654.16A (West 1995).
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arrangements, as well as the unpredictable costs that such rights may
impose on the contracting parties," these "fixed price" preemptive
rights are rare.
While the law generally favors the assignability of contractual
rights," contracts that are deemed "personal" cannot be assigned or
devised.3 In the context of preemptive rights, deciding the assignabil-
ity raises numerous questions of common law property, freedom of
contract, and rules of construction for contracts, deeds, and wills. The
courts have not yet devised a coherent framework for deciding when a
right of first refusal can be assigned, and the varied contexts in which
such rights arise greatly complicate the problem.
In some cases, moreover, the issue will be of little practical conse-
quence, especially if the encumbered property is freely alienable after
the preemptive right has been exercised. For example, if a right of first
refusal is declared "personal" by the courts, what can prevent the
rightholder from exercising that right on behalf of a third party, to
whom he can later sell the underlying property?" How can legislation
(or judicial rules) be crafted to prevent such circumvention without
imposing draconian restraints on alienability? If such rules are im-
possible to develop in certain situations, does that make all preemp-
tive rights de facto assignable?
Despite these objections, the courts should develop a default rule
that rights of first refusal are personal, and not assignable, unless the
parties' agreement clearly indicates otherwise. This approach would
be preferable to relying on a case-by-case determination of the par-
9 See, for example, Iglehart v Phillips, 383 S2d 610, 615-16 (Fla 1980) (involving a fixed
price right of first refusal of indefinite duration that the court held was an unreasonable restraint
on alienation); Colen v Patterson, 436 S2d 182, 182 (Fla App 1983) (same); Missouri State High-
way Commission v Stone, 311 SW2d 588,590 (Mo App 1958) (same).
10 For a general discussion, see David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 Stan J
L, Bus & Fin 1, 14-25 (1999). If A grants B a right of first refusal to purchase a plot of land at a
fixed price of $X, regardless of what the third party offers, one of two things may happen: (1) the
market price may be less than $X at the time the right is triggered, in which case the right would
be worthless to the rightholder, B; (2) the market price may be greater than $X at the time A
wishes to sell the land encumbered by the preemptive right, making him reluctant to sell.
11 Id at 9.
12 See Scott v Fox Brothers Enterprises, Inc, 667 P2d 773,774 (Colo App 1983) (finding as-
signability of a real estate option absent a provision to the contrary).
13 See Sweeney v Lilly, 198 W Va 202, 479 SE2d 863, 866 (1996) (discussing the majority
rule that an option to purchase when devised in a will is personal to the optionee and cannot be
exercised by anyone else); Masterson v Sine, 68 Cal 2d 222,436 P2d 561,566 (1968) (applying the
personal-assignable contract distinction to real estate); Dahl v Zabriskie, 249 Iowa 584, 88 NW2d
66,67 (1958) (same).
14 See Rushford State Bank v Kjos, 445 NW2d 846, 849 (Minn App 1989) (holding that a
former owner may legally assign his right to property after exercising his statutory right of first
refusal).
15 See, for example, Minn Stat Ann §§ 500.24, 500.245 (West 1990 & Supp 2001) (granting
rights of first refusal to former owners of foreclosed farms).
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ties' intent, as it will promote judicial economy and reduce the costs of
contracting. In addition, this default rule will often save preemptive
rights from invalidation under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Finally,
because contracting parties are not indifferent to who is on the other
side of the agreement, his rule will protect the autonomy of contract-
ing parties.
Part I explores why parties enter into agreements containing
rights of first refusal, which is an important factor in determining
whether they should be assignable. It discusses the two main purposes
served by preemptive rights (the prevention of bargaining breakdown
and the inhibition of exit by the owner of the encumbered property)
and whether these purposes sufficiently explain the existence of such
rights in many different contexts (such as franchise agreements, real
estate, and closely held corporations). Part II summarizes the judicial
response to disputes involving the assignability of rights of first re-
fusal, highlighting the complications caused by the Rule Against Per-
petuities and the common law ban on unreasonable restraints on
alienation. Part III then shows why a default rule against assignability
would be desirable in four different contexts: franchise agreements,
statutory rights of first refusal, preemptive rights in real property, and
close corporations. It concludes by questioning the traditional distinc-
tion between "personal" and "assignable" contracts and asserting that
a default rule of nonassignability of preemptive rights will actually
promote freedom of contract.
I. WHY PARTIES ENTER INTO RIGHT OF FIRST
REFUSAL AGREEMENTS
Courts have described a right of first refusal as a "valuable
right"'" and a "powerful instrument."'7 However, there is little discus-
sion in the case law of why parties enter into such arrangements in the
first place. Exploring the purposes of preemptive rights is essential in
determining whether, and under what conditions, they should be as-
signable.
A. Theoretical Explanations for Rights of First Refusal
1. Preventing bargaining breakdown.
The main rationale behind rights of first refusal is the idea that
the rightholder will likely value the encumbered property more highly
than any third party bidder, either because of investments made in the
16 American Broadcasting Companies Inc v Wolf, 76 AD2d 162, 430 NYS2d 275, 281
(1980).
17 Pincus v Pabst Brewing Co, 893 F2d 1544, 1549 (7th Cir 1990).
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property, or perhaps because of intangible value from using the prop-
erty over a long period of time (such as business goodwill, sentimental
value, etc.). Usually, however, someone in this position could simply
outbid any third party seeking to purchase the property, so at first
glance, assuming both parties are rational, a right of first refusal
should not be necessary to provide this added security.8 However,
transaction costs, strategic bargaining, and asymmetric information
may prevent the property from being sold to the person who values it
the most, so a right of first refusal has been traditionally seen as insur-
ance against a future bargaining breakdown.'9
2. Inhibiting exit.
Recent commentary, however, has questioned this traditional ex-
planation for why parties enter into rights of first refusal. The exis-
tence of a preemptive right may deter potential buyers from making
offers because it reduces their expected return from the costs they in-
cur in negotiating and making an offer." This makes the right of first
refusal costly for the contracting parties because it reduces the amount
that can be obtained from the sale of the property.2' In addition, the
possibility of subsequent purchase from the rightholder (if he exer-
cises his preemptive right against the third party bidder) is not as easy
a solution to this problem as some may think. On the other hand, a
potential bidder might be willing to offer more for property encum-
bered by a (non-fixed price) right of first refusal, to deter the
rightholder from exercising his right.2 3 Given the uncertainty
18 David I. Walker, in evaluating these traditional explanations for rights of first refusal, ar-
gues that they are "fundamentally about the risk that the higher valuing insider will fail to con-
summate a purchase, despite his higher valuation," Walker, 5 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 29 (cited in
note 10) (emphasis added).
19 See id at 29-31 (explaining how bargaining breakdown may occur absent a right of first
refusal); Marcel Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal 15-18, New York Uni-
versity, Center for Law and Business, Working Paper No 99-009 *15-18 (June 1999), available
online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=11382> (visited March 26, 2001) (ex-
plaining that rights of first refusal may increase efficiency by improving rightholders' incentives
to increase the value of the property and by reducing the costs associated with strategic bargain-
ing).
20 See Walker, 5 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 23 (cited in note 10).
21 See id at 27. Walker also relies on anecdotal evidence from practicing attorneys who
suggest that rights of first refusal in corporate stock and in real estate deter potential buyers. See
id at 25.
22 See id at 24. If the rightholder exercises his right, Walker argues that the unsuccessful
bidder only knows that her bid was less than the value of the property to the rightholder; she
does not know whether the rightholder actually values it more highly than she does. Hence, ne-
gotiations with the rightholder may be futile and will still add costs to the process. Moreover, in
the shareholder context, the other shareholders will often maintain their preemptive rights in the
shares purchased by the rightholder.
23 A potential buyer, encountering another potential buyer possessing a right of first re-
fusal at, say, the market price, might consider bidding very high in order to discourage the buyer
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surrounding how much the rightholder values the encumbered prop-
erty, the third party bidder will not want his efforts to be wasted if the
rightholder matches his offer.
David I. Walker claims that a commitment to auction' (where the
rightholder is notified of the owner's intent to sell and given the op-
portunity to participate in an auction) would be a less costly way to
prevent future bargaining breakdown between the parties." Because
parties continue to opt for the more expensive right of first refusal,
there is likely another motive for such arrangements: to inhibit exit.26
Especially in the close corporation context, where stability is valued,
Walker argues that the primary purpose of preemptive rights is to
prevent the unilateral departure of a partner." The desire to inhibit
exit seems less plausible, however, in franchise agreements or real es-
tate, so it is important to analyze the different contexts in which pre-
emptive rights arise.
B. Common Preemptive Rights
1. Franchise agreements.
Some commentators have suggested that a right of first refusal
creates incentives for rightholders to invest." For example, a lessee or
a franchisee may be reluctant to invest in his property or business if
the lessor or franchisor can refuse to renew his agreement at whim.
While a longer-term contract would also spur investment by protect-
ing a contracting party from an opportunistic refusal to deal, such an
arrangement would also commit the party to a long-term relationship
unless he can negotiate a release. With a right of first refusal, however,
the rightholder maintains his exit option-he can simply decline to
exercise the right. Preemptive rights, therefore, can maintain flexibility
possessing the right of first refusal from even bothering to match. In this way, the high bidder,
lacking any right of first refusal, would save resources that might otherwise be spent bargaining
with the ightholder.
24 See id at 40-41 (describing how a commitment to auction would work). The property
would be awarded to the highest bidder or retained by the owner if the highest bid fell short of
his "reservation price."
25 See id at 40-43.
26 See id at 43.
27 See id at 44. Walker points out that unlike naked restraints on sales, rights of first refusal
have largely been accepted by the courts and therefore are more effective in restraining alien-
ation than their more drastic counterparts. See id.
28 See Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal at *15 (cited in note 19);
Walker, 5 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 36 (cited in note 10). In American Broadcasting Companies Inc
v Wolf, 76 AD2d 162, 430 NYS2d 275 (1980), the court noted that rights of first refusal are used
by employers in the broadcasting industry to retain "the services of major talent in whom the
broadcaster has made a significant investment." Id at 280-81. See also Christopher T. Wonnell,
The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46 Stan L Rev 87, 108 (1993) (discussing the
right of first refusal in American Broadcasting Companies).
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while preventing opportunism and may often be more desirable than
a long-term or short-term contract.
2. Preemptive rights in real property.
The "inhibiting exit" rationale does not seem as plausible in the
context of real estate. It seems most unlikely that one would purchase
a right of first refusal in real estate in order to prevent the property
owner from selling the property. On the contrary, the rightholder is
probably anxious to purchase the property and would like the prop-
erty owner to dispose of it as soon as possible. Perhaps the failure of
parties to take advantage of the commitment to auction reflects the
fact that it has not yet been developed as a contractual device, and
parties are reluctant to use such an untested and uncertain legal
right." Therefore, it seems that in the context of real property, the tra-
ditional explanation that parties are seeking to avoid a bargaining
breakdown remains a valid explanation for why parties create rights
of first refusal.
3. Closely held corporations.
In closely held corporations, commentators have argued that
rights of first refusal (like all other restrictions on the alienation of
shares) principally serve the purpose of maintaining family control or
ensuring compatibility with management.' Such restrictions may also
enable compliance with the federal securities laws.31 The "inhibition of
exit" theory of preemptive rights is strongest in this context.
4. Statutory rights of first refusal.
Some midwestern states have granted rights of first refusal to the
former owners of foreclosed farms.2 Minnesota enacted such a law in
1986 to "encourage and protect the family farm as a basic economic
unit, to insure it as the most socially desirable mode of agricultural
production, and to enhance and promote the stability and well-being
of rural society in Minnesota and the nuclear family."33 Because these
rights of first refusal are not created by the market, but rather im-
29 Walker acknowledges this point, admitting that he is unaware of such a device currently
in use. See Walker, 5 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 42 (cited in note 10).
30 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law 229 (Harvard 1991) (discussing restrictions on alienation of shares of closely held corpora-
tions).
31 See O'Neal and Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations at § 7.02 (cited in note 3).
32 See, for example, Iowa Code Ann § 654.16 (West 1995) (allowing a mortgagor to redeem
a homestead at fair market value).
33 Minn Stat Ann § 500.24, subd 1.
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posed by statute, commentators have viewed them with suspicion8
Because preemptive rights discourage bidders and therefore impose
costs on both parties to the transaction,35 these statutory rights have
been criticized for their adverse economic effects.-
Regardless of whether such statutory rights of first refusal are so-
cially desirable, the legislatures and the courts must decide whether
they can be assigned. In Rushford State Bank v Kjos,37 the court held
that a former owner of a foreclosed farm may legally assign his right
to the property after exercising his statutory right of first refusal.3 In
response, the Minnesota legislature amended the statute to prohibit
assignments, confining the right of first refusal to the former owner
and his heirs.39 In 1988, the legislature again amended the statute to
outlaw prearranged sales between the former owner and a third party,
before the former owner exercised his right of first refusal.4 If a third
party bidder's first offer to the lending institution is matched by the
former owner, however, the third party is allowed to make additional
offers to the rightholder after the right of first refusal is exercised,
provided that there was no collusion between the bidder and the
rightholder.4'
Even if this distinction between transfers arranged before and af-
ter the exercise of the preemption right may resolve issues under the
statute, the improper use of the right of first refusal may raise other
41
complications. In Schumacher v Ihrke, the court held that even
though the statute may allow the sale of property after exercising the
right of first refusal, the rightholder may still be liable to a third party
43
bidder for tortious interference of contract.
One commentator has suggested that a statutorily imposed com-
mitment to auction would be preferable to a regime of statutory rights
34 See Thomas J. Houser, Note, A Comparative Study of the Former Owner's Right of First
Refusal Upon a Lender's Resale of Foreclosed Agricultural Land: A New Form of State Mortgagor
Relief Legislation, 13 J Corp L 895,907-14 (1988) (reviewing and criticizing the statutes); Robert
M. Lawless, Note, The American Response to the Farm Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 U
Ill L Rev 1037, 1062-63 (same).
35 See text accompanying notes 20-22.
36 See Walker, 5 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 55 (cited in note 10) (arguing that "[s]uch a statute
transfers value from bank to farmer and depresses the expected value of the farmland in a sale,
and this appears to be a case in which the impact of the right of first refusal is significant").
37 445 NW2d 846 (Minn App 1989).
38 Id at 849.
39 See Elfering v Schleusner, 1991 Minn App LEXIS 530, *3-4 (describing the amendments
made to Minn Stat § 500.24 from 1987-88).
40 See Kjesbo v Ricks, 517 NW2d 585, 589 (Minn 1994) (holding that a prearranged sale of
property after person exercises his statutory right of first refusal violates the statute).
41 Id.
42 469 NW2d 329 (Minn App 1991).
43 Id at 332-34.
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of first refusal." Because the existence of preemptive rights discour-
ages bidders, the statutes impose costs on both the lending institution
and the farm owner. Moreover, by reducing what the bank can obtain
in a foreclosure sale of the property (since fewer people will bid and
because the former owner need only match, rather than outbid, offers
from competitors), nonwaivable preemptive rights will lead to higher
interest rates and more restrictive lending practices."5 The distributive
consequences of the preemptive right will benefit defaulting farmers,
not at the expense of banks, but at the expense of the nondefaulting
borrowers. Therefore, courts should hesitate before allowing the as-
signability of such rights in the name of furthering the statutory pur-
pose of protecting farmers.4' In Minnesota, the statute has already de-
cided this issue for the courts.
II. CURRENT LAW
A. When Assignability Is Explicitly Addressed in the Contract
Courts have generally held that the intent of the parties is dispo-
sitive in deciding whether a right of first refusal is assignable or per-
sonal." Where a contract explicitly provides that the right be transfer-
able, courts will usually defer to this provision." However, in Vogel v
Melish,' 9 the court held that a preemptive right in a stockholder's
agreement was personal, despite an express provision that the agree-
ment "shall be binding upon and inuring to the benefit of the parties
hereto and their respective administrators, executors, heirs and per-
sonal representatives."' (The provision did not, however, include "as-
signs.") The Vogel court reasoned that as a restraint on alienation, the
44 See Walker, 5 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 56 (cited in note 10).
45 See id at 55-56.
46 Judge Posner has explained:
The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of contract disputes can redistribute
wealth is one of the most persistent illusions of judicial power. It comes from failing to con-
sider the full consequences of legal decisions. Courts deciding contract cases cannot durably
shift the balance of advantages to the weaker side of the market; they can only make con-
tracts more costly to that side in the future, because franchisors will demand compensation
for bearing onerous terms.
The Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co, Inc v River Valley Cookies, Ltd, 970
F2d 273,282 (7th Cir 1992).
47 See, for example, Midwest Communications, Inc v Minnesota Twins, Inc, 779 F2d 444,455
(8th Cir 1985) (stating that "[w]hen construing a contract, the fact-finder must allow the parties'
intent to prevail").
48 See, for example, Jordahl v Concordia College, 1998 Minn App LEXIS 6, *6 (enforcing a
written agreement that allowed a right of first refusal to be assigned only with the written con-
sent of the grantor, a college).
49 31111 2d 620,203 NE2d 411 (1964).
50 Id at 412-13.
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shareholder's agreement was to be strictly construed.5' It also empha-
sized the "personal character" of the agreement in holding that the
contract "does not negate the implied condition that death of either
party excuses the survivor from further performance."52
At the other extreme, the parties' contract might expressly de-
clare that the right of first refusal is personal, and courts will usually
agree. But in Smith v Smith,3 the court held a right of first refusal to
be assignable, even though the contract explicitly stated that it was
personal and could not be assigned. The court did so because the
contract was "replete with references to successors in interest."5
Therefore, Vogel and Smith show that simply labeling a right of
first refusal as "personal" or "assignable" in the contract will not
automatically resolve the issue in court. Both cases contained unusual
fact patterns (the contract in Vogel left out "assigns" and the contract
in Smith contained provisions that contradicted its "personal" label),
however, that tipped the scale away from the explicit language in the
contract. Absent such unusual facts, contracting parties that explicitly
write their intent into their agreement will usually have their intent
upheld in court.
B. Problems with Assignability
The more challenging cases involve contracts where the parties'
intent is unclear as to assignability, and courts have taken widely di-
vergent approaches. Some courts will construe a right of first refusal
as personal unless language such as "heirs and assigns" is included in
the contract." Other courts will construe the preemptive right as as-
signable, even without this precise language.7
Though courts may differ on the need for "magic words," absent
any evidence of intent, preemptive rights are generally construed as
nontransferable." Still, the strength of the presumption may differ de-
pending on the context.
51 Idat413.
52 Idat414.
53 116 AD2d 810,497 NYS2d 192 (1986).
54 Id at 193.
55 Id. The Smith court went on to hold that this interpretation of the agreement rendered
the right of first refusal violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities. See id.
56 See, for example, Davis v Anthony, 1998 Ohio App LEXIS 6177, *6 (holding that a right
of first refusal is unassignable, unless language such as "heirs and assigns" is included in the con-
tract).
57 See, for example, Brooks v Terteling, 107 Idaho 262,688 P2d 1167,1169-70 (1984) (hold-
ing that a grant of a right of first refusal need not contain the language of "heirs and assigns" to
be assignable).
58 See Matter ofWauka, Inc, 39 BR 734,737 (N D Ga 1984) (holding that a right of first re-
fusal is personal because it did not include the grantee's "successors or assigns," though it was
binding on the grantor's "successors or assigns"); Sweeney v Lilly, 198 W Va 202, 479 SE2d 863,
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1. Problems with the Rule Against Perpetuities.
One important issue for the courts is whether to interpret the as-
signability of a preemptive right in a way that would invalidate it.
Nonpersonal preemptive rights are more likely to conflict with the
Rule Against Perpetuities and the common law rules against restraints
on alienability.9 In ascertaining the "intent" of the parties, it would
seem odd to interpret an ambiguous contractual provision in a way
that would render it void. 6 At the same time, the parties may not be
conscious of these common law rules when negotiating and drafting
their agreement.
In traditional common law jurisdictions, a right of first refusal of
indefinite duration violates the common law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties." Because a freely assignable preemptive right might conceivably
vest outside the common law time limit, 6' numerous courts have de-
clared these assignable rights to be void.3
This does not mean, however, that all rights of first refusal must
be personal or else invalid in these jurisdictions. Individual parties
866 (1996) (holding that an option to purchase in a will is presumed to be personal and not as-
signable); Davis, 1998 Ohio App LEXIS 6177 at *6 (holding that a right of first refusal is unas-
signable, unless language such as "heirs and assigns" is included in the contract); Board of Educa-
tion v Homewood Corp, 1996 Ohio App LEXIS 3519, *7 (holding that a right of first refusal in
land is personal and cannot be assigned); Morris v Walls, 1996 Del Ch LEXIS 158, *7-9 (holding
that a right of first refusal in land is not assignable because assignability was not explicit in the
contract); Bloomer v Phillips, 164 AD2d 52, 562 NYS2d 840, 842 (1990) (holding that a right of
first refusal that was not made binding on the plaintiffs' heirs and assigns would terminate upon
plaintiffs' deaths); Old National Bank of Washington v Arneson, 54 Wash App 717, 776 P2d 145,
148-49 (1989) (discussing the presumption of nontransferability).
59 Because a personal right of first refusal will expire at the death of the rightholder, it will
always vest within twenty-one years of lives in being. Also, its limited time will more likely be
seen as a reasonable restraint on alienation, rather than a preemptive right that will encumber
the property ad infinitum. See Fisher v Fisher, 23 Mass App 205,500 NE2d 821,822 (1986) (not-
ing that restraints upon alienation are disfavored, so if one construction imposes less of a re-
straint than another, the less restraining construction is preferred).
60 In the choice-of-law context, see Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187 crt e
at 565-66 (1969) (stating that if the chosen law in the parties' choice-of-law clause invalidates the
contract, it should be disregarded as a mistake). But see Foreman v George Foreman Associates,
517 F2d 354, 357 (9th Cir 1975) (choosing law that invalidates a contract where public policy fa-
vors invalidation).
6t The common law Rule Against Perpetuities says that any interest, to be valid, must vest
or fail within lives in being plus twenty-one years. Black's Law Dictionary 1331 (West 7th ed
1999). See also note 59.
62 If X conveys to Y a right of first refusal in land that X owns, and that right is freely as-
signable, then Y could sell the right to Z. Because Z could exercise this right more than twenty-
one years after X and Y (the only lives in being) are dead, the right of first refusal would violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
63 See, for example, Nash v Scott, 62 Ark App 8, 966 SW2d 936, 937 (1998) (holding that a
right of first refusal in land granted to an individual and his "heirs and assigns" violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities); Buck v Banks, 668 NE2d 1259, 1261 (Ind App 1996) (holding that a right
of first refusal, applied to "all heirs, executors, administrators and assigns" violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities).
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could create assignable rights that expire twenty-one years after their
death, and corporate parties could create assignable rights that expire
twenty-one years after the right's creation.4' The purchaser of the
rights would likely be on notice of when the rights expire, so their lim-
ited duration should not have a chilling effect on their transferability,
although it might affect their price.
Unfortunately, the contracting parties in these jurisdictions often
neglect explicitly to limit the duration of a right of first refusal. While
some courts will invalidate these rights, others will interpret these
rights (in commercial contexts) to last only for twenty-one years so as
not to violate the Rule.65 Other courts rewrite the contract to make the
right expire within a "reasonable time.' Moreover, some courts will
interpret a right of first refusal as personal even though the contract is
silent as to its assignability, because constructions that avoid violating
the Rule Against Perpetuities are favored.67
In jurisdictions that have adopted the "wait and see" doctrine," a
freely assignable right of first refusal will be valid if exercised within
twenty-one years after the most recent death.69 However, "wait and
see" may not be retroactively applied to save rights created before its
adoption."
In some jurisdictions that have retained the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, a right of first refusal is not even subject to the Rule.7 Hence,
64 See Ferrero Construction Co v Dennis Rourke Corp, 311 Md 560, 536 A2d 1137, 1144
(1988) (holding that a right of first refusal between two corporations, not limited to a term of
years, violates the Rule Against Perpetuities).
65 See Continental Cablevision of New England, Inc v United Broadcasting Co, 873 F2d
717, 729-30 (4th Cir 1989) (discussing the Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to commercial
transactions).
66 See Mazzeo v Kartman, 234 NJ Super 223,560 A2d 733,737 (1989) (holding that a right
of first refusal that lasts "forever" violates the Rule Against Perpetuities but that if a judge can-
not determine the actual intent of the parties, he should determine a "reasonable time" for the
expiration of the right).
67 See Nickels v Cohn, 764 SW2d 124, 132-33 (Mo App 1989) (holding that a right of first
refusal that does not contain the words "heirs and assigns" is personal and does not violate the
Rule).
68 The "wait and see" doctrine looks to actual events as they unfold, rather than possibili-
ties. See Black's Law Dictionary at 1574 (cited in note 61). Rather than voiding the preemptive
right because of the possibility that it might vest more than twenty-one years after lives in being,
the "wait and see" approach saves the right if it actually is exercised during that time.
69 See McCormick v Camp Pocono Ridge, Inc, 781 F Supp 328,335 (M D Pa 1991) (holding
that the Rule was not violated when the relevant persons (lives in being) had only been dead for
thirteen years because it had been exercised within twenty-one years of the death of the gran-
tor);JV1 Builders, Inc v First Citizens Corp, 1995 Va Cir LEXIS 1401, *17-18 (holding that a right
of first refusal in land owned by a corporation would ordinarily violate the Rule, but the "wait
and see" statute allows it to be exercised within twenty-one years of the creation of the interest).
70 See Lake of the Woods Association, Inc v McHugh, 238 Va 1,380 SE2d 872, 875 (1989)
(discussing retroactive application of "wait and see" statutes).
71 See Gartley v Ricketts, 107 NM 451,760 P2d 143, 145 (1988) (holding that a right of first
refusal is not a future interest and not subject to the Rule); Robroy Land Co, Inc v Prather, 95
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assignable rights of indefinite duration held by persons or corpora-
tions will be valid in these jurisdictions.
Other courts have relied on policy considerations in exempting
rights of first refusal from the Rule Against Perpetuities. One court,
while acknowledging that an assignable right of first refusal in a con-
dominium association would be a "technical" violation of the Rule,
nevertheless invoked "important considerations of public policy" and
upheld the right.72 Another court allowed an explicitly transferable
right of indefinite duration because it would be "compatible with the
policies of commerce and utilization of land."7
New York has recognized a narrower exception to the Rule
Against Perpetuities for rights of first refusal, applying it to commer-
cial and governmental transactions, but not to transactions between
private individuals.4 Hence, courts in New York are more likely to in-
terpret rights of first refusal between private individuals as personal
rather than assignable, in order to save them from the Rule Against
Perpetuities."
The Restatement (Third) of Servitudes has completely exempted
rights of first refusal from the Rule Against Perpetuities, rejecting the
position of the Restatement (Second) of Property.76 The Restatement
(Third) notes that a growing number of courts have rejected applica-
tion of the Rule Against Perpetuities, recognizing that it needlessly in-
validated legitimate transactions.7
2. Unreasonable restraints on alienation.
Preemptive rights may also be void as unreasonable restraints on
alienation. Factors to consider in deciding whether such a restraint is
reasonable include (1) its purpose; (2) its duration; and (3) the method
Wash 2d 66, 622 P2d 367, 370 (1980) (holding that a right of first refusal is a personal right rather
than an interest in land and, therefore, is not subject to the Rule).
72 See Cambridge Co v East Slope Investment Corp, 700 P2d 537, 540 (Colo 1985) (stating
that "[c]ourts have not applied the [R]ule mechanically where its purposes [preventing restraint
on alienation and encouraging improvement of property] will not be served").
73 Shiver v Benton, 251 Ga 284, 304 SE2d 903, 907 (1983) (holding that a right of first re-
fusal by tenants in common does not violate the Rule).
74 Compare Metropolitan Transportation Authority v Bruken Realty Corp, 501 NYS2d 306,
492 NE2d 379,384 (1986) (stating that "neither 'lives in being' nor 'twenty one years' are periods
which are relevant to business or governmental affairs"), with Adler v Simpson, 203 AD2d 691,
610 NYS2d 351,353-54 (1994) (holding that a right of first refusal in land is personal and cannot
be assigned). The distinction seems to be that there is less "government or public interest" in pri-
vate individual transactions as well as the fact that private individuals can be measured by rele-
vant lives in being. See Adler, 610 NYS2d at 354.
75 See Adler, 610 NYS2d at 353-54.
76 Compare Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.3 cmt a at 425 (1991), with
Restatement (Second) of Property § 4.4 cmt c at 211 (1981).
77 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.3 cmt b at 427-28.
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of determining the price."8 As noted earlier, there has been consider-
able judicial hostility to "fixed price" rights of first refusal (as com-
pared to a right to match the price offered by a third party) because
fixed price rights "clearly discourage[ ] any improvements of the land
by the existing property owner."9 An owner of property encumbered
by such a right would have little incentive to improve its value beyond
the fixed price.
Some courts, however, will uphold fixed price rights of first re-
fusal if they can be interpreted as personal to the original grantee be-
cause such rights are not of unlimited duration.8' Moreover, one court
has suggested that even an assignable fixed price right of first refusal
might be upheld.8'
3. Covenants running with the land.
Finally, in the real estate context, some rights of first refusal are
construed as covenants running with the land.n Such rights would be
assignable, but only as attached to the parcel of land. Most courts,
however, seem to hold that a right of first refusal does not touch and
concern the land, and therefore is not a real covenant. 8 These cases,
78 See Hartnett v Jones, 629 P2d 1357, 1363 (Wyo 1981) (holding that a preemptive right is
not an unreasonable restraint on alienation where the purpose is limited and the seller sets the
price).
79 Iglehart v Phillips, 383 S2d 610,615 (Fla 1980) (holding that a fixed price right of first re-
fusal of indefinite duration was an unreasonable restraint on alienation). See also Restatement
(First) of Property § 413(2) (1944) (stating that a right of first refusal at a fixed price, or at a per-
centage of the price offered by another person, is valid only if the restraint is valid under Sec-
tions 406-11).
80 See Fisher v Fisher, 23 Mass App 205, 500 NE2d 821, 822 (1986) (holding that a right of
first refusal in land at a fixed price did not survive the death of the two grantees because the
deed did not mention "heirs and assigns" and to hold otherwise would be an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation).
81 See Rowlee v Dietrich, 88 AD2d 751, 451 NYS2d 467, 469 (1982) (holding that a fixed
price preemptive right, explicitly assignable, was not per se an unreasonable restraint on alien-
ation without "additional factors which bear on the reasonableness of the restriction").
82 See In re Coordinated Financial Planning Corp, 65 BR 711,712 (BAP 9th Cir 1986) (not-
ing that, under California law, a right of first refusal is a covenant running with the land); Sher-
wood Ford, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 860 F Supp 659,662 (E D Mo 1994) (same, but under Missouri
law).
83 See In re Fleishman, 138 BR 641,644 (Bankr D Mass 1992) (holding that a right of first
refusal "does not touch and concern the land" and therefore does not run with the land); Levy v
Blue Ridge Construction Co, Inc, 74 Misc 2d 676,345 NYS2d 314,316-17 (Sup Ct 1973) (holding
that a right of first refusal to purchase land was a personal covenant running only to grantees
and not running with the land); Ricketson v Bankers First Savings Bank, FSB, 233 Ga App 11,
503 SE2d 297, 298-99 (1998) (construing a right of first refusal as a personal covenant that did
not run with the land); Nichols v Lake Toxaway Co, Inc, 98 NC App 313, 390 SE2d 770, 773-74
(1990) (holding that a right of first refusal, which the deed said "shall run with the land and be
binding on all parties and all persons claiming under them in perpetuity," was nevertheless a per-
sonal grant because the right was specifically limited to the grantee and not his heirs and as-
signs); Feider v Feider, 40 Wash App 589, 699 P2d 801, 803-04 (1985) (holding that a right of first
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however, do not address whether the rights of first refusal that fail the
real covenant test are assignable apart from land.
III. SHOULD A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL BE ASSIGNABLE?
A. Adopting a Presumption Against Assignability
The courts' current approach to the assignability of preemptive
rights, which relies heavily on the intent of the parties, is unsatisfac-
tory. Judicial inquiry into the parties' states of mind is time consuming
and expensive, and it becomes almost impossible for such a dispute to
be resolved on summary judgment.- Instead, the courts should de-
velop a set of default rules8 for these situations, keeping in mind the
reasons why the parties entered these arrangements.
The types of default rules a court should consider in these cases
include "problem-solving defaults," "equilibrium-inducing defaults,"
and "information-forcing defaults." A problem-solving default sup-
plies the provision the parties would have chosen "had they been in-
formed, rational, and faced with zero transaction costs." An equilib-
rium-inducing default provides the welfare maximizing term." Finally,
an information-forcing default is usually unfavorable to the more so-
phisticated party, encouraging him to make clear the terms of the con-
tract to the unsophisticated party."
Contracting parties are not indifferent to who is on the other side
of the agreement. The value of a contract will often depend on what
type of person possesses the right of first refusal. If a landowner con-
veys a right of first refusal in a parcel of land next to his house, it will
matter greatly to him whether his potential neighbors are orderly or
disruptive. While there may be judicial remedies against bad
refusal was not a covenant running with the land, despite the parties' intent that it was, because it
did not touch and concern the land and there was no horizontal privity).
84 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 10B Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2732.2 at 152-53 (West 3d ed 1998) (noting that cases involving "a determina-
tion regarding intentions or motives are particularly unsuitable for summary adjudication").
85 There have been at least six categories of default rules recognized by commentators. See
Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl
L J 389, 390-91 (1993) (identifying and describing the six categories: problem-solving defaults,
equilibrium-inducing defaults, information-forcing defaults, normative defaults, transformative
defaults, and structural defaults).
86 Id at 390. See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Principles
and Policies 1-16 (Foundation 1982) (discussing the Uniform Commercial Code as providing
problem-solving default rules).
87 For a general discussion, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Ineffi-
ciency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729 (1992) (examining how transac-
tions costs and market power affect incentives to contract around default rules).
88 See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19
J Legal Stud 597,609-11 (1990) (discussing information-forcing default rules).
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neighbors," such as nuisance actions, they will often come with sub-
stantial litigation costs. A nonassignable right of first refusal would
protect the grantor from being forced to sell his property to someone
to whom he would rather not sell it.
This problem is not unique to contracts involving preemptive
rights; it is pervasive throughout contract law. The law's distinction be-
tween "personal" and "assignable" contractual rights ignores the fact
that in many "nonpersonal" arrangements, the contracting parties care
deeply about who is on the other side of the agreement. In the event
of dispute or breach, the contract itself provides limited protection.
Expectation damages are often undercompensatory due to litigation
costs,9' courts are often reluctant to enforce liquidated damages
clauses,' and parties may be reluctant to sue and expose themselves to
the weapons of discovery.93
Under the circumstances described above, the courts should treat
preemptive rights as personal, and not assignable, unless the parties
overcome this presumption with explicit contractual provisions. This
default rule will promote greater certainty in outcome, even though
there will still be some disputes at the margins over whether the par-
ties' expressed intentions are sufficient to overcome the presumption.
Although a default rule against assignability may seem like a restraint
on freedom of contract, it will in fact protect the autonomy of con-
tracting parties by preventing them from being stuck in undesirable
relationships if the preemptive right can be assigned without their
consent. The benefits of this rule can clearly be seen in the varied con-
texts in which contracting parties seek to create rights of first refusal.
89 See, for example, Griffin v Northridge, 153 P2d 800, 803 (Cal App 1944) (imposing nui-
sance damages on a neighbor who "wilfully frustrate[d] the peace and comfort of another with-
out just cause").
90 Forbidding the assignment of rights of first refusal would not necessarily solve this prob-
lem, especially if the rightholder can exercise his "unassignable" right and then immediately sell
the property to the bad neighbors, assuming there are no restraints on alienation on the underly-
ing land. To prevent this, a landowner could make the exercise of the right contingent on the
rightholder accepting some limited restraints on alienability, such as preventing him from selling
or leasing the land for five years after exercising the right or forbidding him from selling the land
for a limited period of time without the consent of the right grantor. The landowner would face a
challenge similar to the state of Minnesota's efforts to prevent statutory rights of first refusals
from being used by those other than the intended beneficiaries. See Part I.B.4.
91 See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L J 271,276 (1979) (argu-
ing that expectation damages may often undercompensate).
92 See, for example, Lake River Corp v Carborundum Co, 769 F2d 1284, 1288-92 (7th Cir
1985) (holding a liquidated damages provision in a contract to be an invalid penalty clause).
93 For a general discussion, see Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest
in Contract Law, 109 Yale L J 1885 (2000) (examining the secrecy costs of obtaining compensa-
tion for a contract breach).
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B. Application of the Presumption in Different Contexts
1. Franchise agreements.
There are probably few relationships in contract law where the
identity of the party with which one deals is more important than in a
franchise arrangement. A poorly managed franchise can stain the
reputation of an entire national chain," and state legislation has made
it increasingly difficult for franchisors to terminate underperforming
franchisees." It is not surprising that Ray Kroc, the founder of
McDonald's, considered the selection of his franchisees to be crucial
to his company's success," and that his franchise agreements would
expressly prohibit transfer without the consent of McDonald's.6
In Schupack v McDonald's System, Inc,"' McDonald's had given
Bernard Copeland, one of its franchisees in Bellevue, Nebraska, a
right of first refusal to purchase any future McDonald's franchises that
might be developed in the Omaha, Nebraska and Council Bluffs, Iowa
areas. The right, however, did not contain any language regarding its
assignability." Copeland later attempted to assign that right, along
with all his interests in McDonald's franchises in the Omaha and
Council Bluffs areas, to the plaintiff. McDonald's argued that the right
of first refusal was intended to be personal to Copeland, and could not
be assigned to the plaintiffs.'6
The trial court ruled against McDonald's and held the right was
not a personal contract and was freely transferable.'' The Nebraska
Supreme Court reversed, claiming that the district court erred in de-
termining the intent of the parties. After giving a detailed history of
McDonald's franchise practices and relying heavily on parol evi-
dence,'6 the court concluded that the right of first refusal was intended
to be personal in nature.'°3 The dissent criticized the majority for not
94 See, for example, Denny's Manager Accused of Racial Bias, LA Times A16 (Jan 8,1998)
(discussing alleged racial discrimination at a Denny's franchise).
95 See, for example, Franchise Practices Act, NJ Stat Ann §§ 56:10-1 et seq (West 1989 &
Supp 2000) (requiring franchisors to give written notice at least sixty days in advance detailing
all reasons for termination, and forbidding franchisors to "terminate, cancel, or fail to renew a
franchise without good cause"). These laws are quite common. See, for example, Ala Stat Ann
§ 8-20-5 (1975) (imposing similar restrictions).
96 See Schupack v McDonald's System, Inc, 200 Neb 485, 264 NW2d 827, 830 (1978) (pro-
viding Kroc's testimony on the importance of franchisee selection).
97 Id at 831.
98 200 Neb 485,264 NW2d 827,829 (1978).
99 Id at 835.
100 Id at 834.
101 Id at 828.
102 Id at 829-34.
103 Id at 836.
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giving proper deference to the trial court's assessment of the evi-
dence.4
Given the difficulties in determining the parties' states of mind,
and the poor incentives to create explicit provisions caused by the lib-
eral use of parol evidence, the court should have resolved the case by
establishing a clear default rule to guide future parties in franchise
agreements. The purpose of preemptive rights in the franchise setting
is more likely to be insurance against bargaining breakdown for the
franchisee than the "inhibiting exit" theory described by Walker.'°5
One option for the court would have been to establish a default
rule of assignability. If nonassignability is valuable to the grantor of
the preemptive right, perhaps the burden should be placed on the
grantor explicitly to contract for this protection, especially if he
drafted the contract. Moreover, McDonald's and most other franchi-
sors will be sophisticated parties, which further strengthens the case
for a default rule of assignability. This approach could be seen as an in-
formation-forcing default rule, ' as it encourages the more sophisti-
cated party, the franchisor, to speak up or be penalized.
Nevertheless, a better default rule would have been to declare
any right of first refusal in a franchise agreement to be personal,
unless the contract explicitly allowed it to be assigned. While it may
seem questionable for the law to presumptively block a voluntary, mu-
tually beneficial exchange between the rightholder and the third party,
in this case, the transaction will certainly affect the franchisor, who is
not privy to their subsequent agreement. The franchisor will have a
strong interest in remaining in a continuous relationship with those
who exercise a right of first refusal over his franchises. Allowing the
franchisee to assign the preemptive right without the franchisor's con-
sent will deprive the franchisor of its much-needed ability to choose
franchisees. It is difficult to believe any franchisor would have con-
tracted for the free assignability of rights of first refusal on its fran-
chises, especially with the legal difficulties involved in terminating a
franchisee. Thus, a default rule of nonassignability in the franchise
context can best be seen as a problem-solving default,'' and perhaps
an equilibrium-inducing default as well, because the detriment to the
104 Id at 839 (White dissenting).
105 See Part I.A.2.
106 For a general discussion, see Scott, 19 J Legal Stud at 597 (cited in note 88) (examining
the approach courts should take to setting default rules); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989)
(same).
107 For a general discussion, see Schwartz and Scott, Commercial Transactions at 1-15 (cited
in note 86).
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franchisor will outweigh the gains to franchisees resulting from the
transfer of the right.
Although either rule would allow the courts to resolve franchise
disputes quickly, without the need to evaluate the credibility of wit-
nesses, a default rule of nonassignability is preferable in this context,
where the personal identity of the franchisee is of utmost importance
to the franchisor.
2. Preemptive rights in real property.
A default rule that declares all rights of first refusal in real prop-
erty to be personal and not assignable, unless the contract explicitly
says otherwise, would not only resolve cases quickly and marginally
protect the autonomy of the grantor of the right, but would avoid
some of the complications that arise with assignable preemptive
rights.
To begin with, courts have struggled with interpreting contracts
that create preemptive rights in the context of the Rule Against Per-
petuities. As discussed earlier, a freely alienable right of first refusal
may be exercised after twenty-one years plus lives in being., How
should courts respond to contracts that fail to specify the assignability
of the right? Should the contracts be altered to fit the Rule? Is it ap-
propriate for courts to "fix" preemptive rights that, due to attorney
sloppiness, violate the unforgiving common law Rule?"° Or, should the
Rule be altered to fit the contracts? If so, should these exceptions to
the Rule be created by courts on a case-by-case basis,"' or should the
legislature enact a clear, broad exemption for rights of first refusal, as
suggested by the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes § 3.3? "2
A default rule of nonassignability in most cases avoids these diffi-
cult questions posed by a case-by-case determination of intent. Courts
will still, however, have to confront these Rule Against Perpetuities
questions when the contract overcomes the presumption by referring
to "assigns." Such a rule will make judging easier and trials less expen-
sive."3 Moreover, parties will seldom want an assignable right that
would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, so an inquiry into the
108 See Schupack, 264 NW2d at 835 (doubting the credibility of one of plaintiff's witnesses).
109 See Section II.B.1.
110 See Mazzeo v Kartman, 234 NJ Super 223, 560 A2d 733, 737 (1989) (holding that the
trial judge "should determine a 'reasonable time' for the expiration of the right").
111 See Cambridge Co v East Slope Investment Corp, 700 P2d 537, 540-41 (Colo 1985)
(holding that courts should not automatically apply the Rule, but should consider public policy).
112 See also 1977 Fla Laws ch 77-23, codified at Fla Stat 689.22(3)(a)(7) (exempting rights of
first refusals from the Rule Against Perpetuities, but repealed in 1988), repealed by 1988 Fla
Laws ch 88-40, § 2.
113 See note 84 and accompanying text.
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"personal" or "assignable" nature of the right, rather than a problem-
solving default rule, seems especially inapt in this context.
Ironically, because of the Rule Against Perpetuities, this default
rule of nonassignability, rather than a case-by-case analysis of intent, is
more likely to do justice in the particular case and would appear to be
the best problem-solving default and equilibrium-inducing default.
Under this regime, we get the benefits of rules (such as low decision
costs and fair notice) plus most of the benefits typically associated
with case-by-case discretion (lower error costs in determining parties'
intent). Moreover, there may be cases where the identity of the
rightholder is important to the owner of the encumbered property, so
this default rule would be preferable to simply abolishing the Rule
Against Perpetuities as applied to rights of first refusal.
Finally, someone seeking to purchase the nonassignable right of
first refusal can wait until the landowner decides to sell, pay the
rightholder to exercise the right, and then resell the land to him, as-
suming the underlying property is freely alienable. Hence, such a de-
fault rule should not completely inhibit land from finding its way to
the highest-value user, although it might increase transaction costs. At
the same time, however, if the rightholder can effectively exercise the
right on behalf of someone else, it appears that the default rule of
nonassignability is meaningless and fails to protect the autonomy of
the right grantor. The right grantor would need to limit the alienation
of the underlying property if the right is exercised and would have to
do so expressly in the agreement. This seems to defeat the purpose of
such a default rule.
Nevertheless, this default rule of nonassignability is still advanta-
geous in the real estate context as it will save many preemptive rights
from the Rule Against Perpetuities as well as promote greater cer-
tainty in litigation.
3. Close corporations.
Because corporations are not lives in being, interpreting their
rights of first refusal as nonassignable will not affect their validity un-
der the Rule Against Perpetuities."4 A corporate-owned right of first
refusal must vest twenty-one years after its creation if a jurisdiction
adheres to the traditional common law Rule Against Perpetuities. '
This is unlike a right of first refusal owned by a person, which, if con-
114 See Metropolitan Transportation Authority v Bruken Realty Corp, NYS2d 306,492 NE2d
379,384 (1986) (discussing the application of the Rule to corporations).
115 See Symphony Space, Inc v Pergola Properties; Inc, 646 NYS2d 641, 669 NE2d 799, 806
(1996) (stating that "[w]here ... the parties to a transaction are corporations and no measuring
lives are stated in the instruments, the perpetuities period is simply 21 years").
100320011
The University of Chicago Law Review
strued as nonassignable, is guaranteed to be exercised during the
rightholder's life in being or not at all. Hence, there is less reason for a
default rule of nonassignability in this context.
However, when preemptive rights are held by individual stock-
holders in close corporations, the restrictions usually seek to maintain
family control,"6 ensure compatible management,"' or assist in comply-
ing with the federal securities laws."' These are goals that will continue
throughout the life of the corporation, regardless of who owns the
stock.
The courts, however, have not always been sensitive to these
functions of preemptive rights in the corporate shareholder setting,
and the case law contains little discussion of these issues. In Storer v
Ripley,"' for example, the court held that a right of first refusal in a
shareholder's agreement was personal and not devisable, absent any
provision as to what was to occur in event of the death of either
party.' If new shareholders purchase the stock, and the other share-
holders decline to exercise their rights of first refusal, it would further
the purposes of the preemptive rights to allow the newcomer to suc-
ceed to the previous owner's right of first refusal. While new share-
holders can always purchase new rights of first refusal from the others,
this could be a difficult and cumbersome process. Even in a close cor-
poration context with few shareholders, the newcomers would have to
get each other shareholder to sell a right of first refusal in his stock,
creating incentives for holdouts and bilateral monopolies that will
raise transaction costs.
On the other hand, it would be unlikely that the shareholders
would want to allow the preemptive right to be assigned to an out-
sider wholly apart from a transfer of stock. For example, if X assigned
his right of first refusal to Y in exchange for money, but X kept his
stock, then Y, an outsider, would be able to purchase stock the next
time any shareholder decided to sell. The other shareholders would
have no opportunity to block either the transfer of the preemptive
right to Y (because they had no right of first refusal in X's right of first
refusal) 2' or Y's subsequent exercise of that right. Allowing such a
116 See Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 229 (cited in note
30).
117 See id.
118 See O'Neal and Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations § 7.05 at 20 (cited in note 3).
119 12 Misc 2d 662,178 NYS2d 7 (Sup Ct 1958).
120 Id at 10. See Vogel v Melish, 31 Il1 2d 620,203 NE2d 411,412-14 (1964) (finding preemp-
tive right in a stockholder agreement personal where agreement did not include the word "as-
signs"). See also notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
121 Creating a right of first refusal in the other stockholders' rights of first refusal would
pose a problem of infinite regress because the second degree right of first refusal could still be
assigned. It would, however, diminish the chance of an outsider acquiring stock without the ac-
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transaction would defeat the purposes of restrictive shareholder
agreements because an outsider, by offering enough money, could in-
filtrate a close corporation without giving the insiders a chance to
block him.
In the close corporation context, the default rule should again be
that the preemptive rights are personal but with an exception if the
transfer accompanies a sale of stock. Such a rule would be consistent
with the purposes of rights of first refusal in the close corporation con-
text, making this an appropriate "problem-solving" and "equilibrium-
inducing" default. The sale would take place either because: (1) the
other shareholders declined to exercise their rights of first refusal, so
they presumably would not object to the new shareholder possessing a
similar right, or (2) the other shareholders exercised their rights of
first refusal, in which case they would already have a right of first re-
fusal over the other shares.
C. Burdens of Proof
The courts have not extensively addressed the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion in disputes over the assignability of preemptive
rights. One court has held that the party asserting that a preemptive
right is invalid bears the burden of proof as to the intent of the par-
ties.'n Usually the party seeking to invalidate a right of first refusal will
argue that it is assignable,121 while the party seeking to preserve it will
claim that it is personal. Under a default rules approach, however, the
burden of proof will typically fall on the party seeking to establish an
interpretation contrary to the default. Hence, rather than assigning the
burden of proof to the party arguing for invalidity of the right (which
may be unclear given the complicated issues involving the Rule
Against Perpetuities), the burden would be placed on the party argu-
ing for assignability.
CONCLUSION
In enacting default rules for the assignability of preemptive rights,
the courts should be sensitive to the reasons such rights are created.
Often, the choice of rule will seem to be of little practical conse-
quence, especially when the encumbered property is freely assignable
after the exercise of the right. In such cases, the rightholder can prear-
quiescence of the current shareholders.
122 See Mclnerney v Slights, 1988 Del Ch LEXIS 47, *12 (holding that the party challenging
validity bears the burden and must prove the "preliminary necessary assertion" that the preemp-
tive right was intended to survive the grantee).
123 This is true because it would be more likely to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities or
be void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
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range a sale to any third party after exercising his right. There is an ex-
ception where such arrangements are prohibited by law, such as with
statutory rights of first refusal created by the government,'24 or when
the right grantor has restricted the assignability of the underlying
property, as McDonald's did in the Schupack case.'2 Even in the unex-
ceptional cases, however, a default rule of nonassignability will still
serve the purposes of judicial economy and protect rights of first re-
fusal from the Rule Against Perpetuities or the ban on unreasonable
restraints on alienation.
In other contexts, particularly close corporations, the shares will
still be encumbered by other shareholders' rights of first refusal, even
after the transfer of stock. Given the reasons for restrictive share-
holder agreements, courts should be reluctant to allow these rights to
be separately alienable from the stock unless the agreement explicitly
allows it.
A default rule of nonassignability of preemptive rights is prefer-
able to the current regime, where courts attempt to classify the rights
as "personal" or "assignable" based on the intentions of the parties. It
will preserve judicial resources and make contracting less expensive
for the parties by providing a clear rule in advance. Moreover, when
the Rule Against Perpetuities is involved, such a default rule will more
likely further the parties' intentions by preventing the invalidation of
the right. Finally, this default rule should be seen as promoting, rather
than inhibiting, the values of autonomy and freedom of contract, as it
protects the right grantor from being forced into a contractual rela-
tionship with an undesirable party.
124 See Part I.B.4.
125 See Part III.B.1.
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